For reasons related to business, Dr. M’s cousin Michael
visited us from New York twice recently in the course of ten days. Cousin Michael, age 43, is a partner in a
major New York law firm, one of whose clients, to give you a sense of the scope
we’re talking about, is the City of San Diego.
That’s right. Cousin
Michael’s law firm represents an entire city.
I wonder where they hold their client meetings. And where they get enough chairs.
“Did everybody get a bagel?”
It must be a logistical nightmare.
Cousin Michael’s claim to fame is that, when he worked for
the U.S. attorney’s office, he was one of the two-lawyer prosecutorial team that
put away Martha Stewart. This caused
some friction in our family (See:
“A Family Torn Asunder” somewhere in the archives), as my daughter
Anna’s life-long hero – for her crafts abilities not her insider trading – was the very same Martha Stewart.
This issue became so tenous that, during the trial, Cousin
Michael actually called Anna and apologized, explaining that he had no choice
but to prosecute her, because Martha Stewart had committed a transgression that
was impossible to ignore:
She had lied to Cousin Michael.
Which in fact was what Martha was eventually convicted
of. Not lying to Cousin Michael – Cousin
Michael’s name is not specifically in the statute; “You could lie to anyone
else, just not him” – but of lying to
the prosecutor (in general.)
(Did Anna ever forgive Cousin Michael? Well, it’s Anna, and she learned from
me. So, not entirely, no.)
Okay, so on the first visit, during dinner at our house, Cousin
Michael makes a comment I do not understand, which is this:
“There is no statute passed by Congress stating that it is
illegal to engage in insider trading.”
Little explosions immediately go off in my head. I had thought Martha Stewart had gone to the slammer
for lying to the prosecutor, concerning the issue of engaging in insider
trading. But if there is, in fact, no
statute stating it is illegal to
engage in insider trading, how do you then go to the slammer for lying about
engaging in an activity that is itself
not illegal? If a person can be
convicted for lying about something that itself is not illegal, wouldn’t all of us be in jail?
“Did you leave the top
of the peanut butter jar?”
“No.”
Bang! (with the gavel)
“Six months!”
During his first
visit, Cousin Michael carefully explained why Martha Stewart, despite lying
about an activity that is not illegal, was nonetheless required to go up the
river (where she sweated out six months knitting a poncho.)
And I did not understand his answer.
My not understanding was revelatory to me. My
“road not taken” is “lawyer”, and a real life lawyer had explained a simple but
critical distinction concerning this issue, a distinction that would send
Martha Stewart to the (knitting) calaboose for lying about an activity which is
not itself a crime.
And I just didn’t get
it.
I mean, this is
what lawyers do for a living. If I
couldn’t get my head around the reasoning, then forget about, “I couldn’t be a
lawyer, because I could not handle the responsibility of my clients’ relying on
me”, I couldn’t be a lawyer, because,
despite my (rather elevated) regard for my intellectual capacities, I was
simply not smart enough.
(We pause for a moment for my [lawyer] brother’s line: “The job of the lawyer is to make
distinctions between identical situations.”
That’s a funny joke. And it may
actually be true. But more likely what’s true is that the
distinctions, though not exactly
identical, are extremely difficult to distinguish.)
The result of Cousin Michael’s explanation – which I was
unable to understand – made me unsure that, had I become a lawyer, I would have possessed the patience, precision,
and the intellectual firepower to decipher
such distinctions. Also, and possibly
more importantly, during my preparation and subsequent argument in front of human
beings, I am not entirely certain I would be able to explain these microscopic distinctions
between exceedingly similar situations
With a straight face.
Because – were there nothing important weighing in the
balance –
It’s funny.
“Mr. Pomerantz, are you saying these situations are
different?”
“I am, Your Honor.”
“Then why are you giggling?”
Okay. I am not going
to be a lawyer, and I’ve discovered exciting new reasons why it would never
have worked out. Still, I need to follow
up with Cousin Michael, one, to clarify the mystery of incarcerating a woman
for lying about something that is not against the law, but two, and more
importantly, because I needed, for my own satisfaction, to see if, after an
additional repetition, I could understand the explanation.
Cousin Michael’s second visit provided the opportunity. Before dinner, I spirited him away to a private
area of the house, and I asked him to tell me again – slowly – how a person can
go to jail for lying about doing something that is statutorily not a crime.
Cousin Michael’s explanation was, by non-lawyerly standards,
not simple, but it was followable. Which
was a welcome boost to my intellectual insecurities. (Still, this was just one “distinctions with hardly any difference whatsoever.” And as a lawyer, these issues would come
flying at you day and night.)
Cousin Michael’s answer?
(A shortened version): Although
there is no statute prohibiting insider trading, there is a statute prohibiting “fraud and deceit.” So if the insider trading situation rises to
the “fraud and deceit” standard – as they say in Law & Order – Chung! Chung! (Or whatever we decided that sound is.)
Sometimes, it was explained to me, insider trading is seen
to meet the level of “fraud and deceit”, and sometimes, it isn’t. The nature of that distinction, at least from
an outsider’s perspective, is screamingly imperceptible; in the end, it is up
to the judge to decide. (After the fact. Which means, you might believe – and have been advised by your attorney – that what you
were doing was acceptable, only to find out later
that it wasn’t. What a hoot, huh?)
As we headed in to dinner, Cousin Michael volunteered that
what he was involved in is at times a “Through The Looking Glass” experience. Meaning, the decisions he must accept can be
arbitrarily inconsistent from case to case.
When I followed up on this after dinner, Cousin Michael seemed to
reverse himself, asserting that an answer (for example, when advising his
client) can always be determined, depending on the specific facts of the case.
To me, this sounded like a guy unwilling to admit that, at
least sometimes, what he did for his lavishly remunerated living, did not
entirely make sense.
This could, however, be the self-serving interpretation of a
man who decided to do something else.
Show business? That makes sense,
All the time.
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