"The Missing 'Edge'"

If a baseball team has good pitching, good hitting and good fielding, and they are virtually the same team as the one that went to the World Series, and came within one game of winning it last year, and thisyear with virtually exactly the same roster they are struggling desperately to make playoffs, it is then reasonable to point the accusing finger for this lackluster season notat the participants on the field but instead at the participants off the field – meaning the executive “Front Office”, which, after the longest sentence I have ever written, I hereby blamingly call out.

Whew.

A little baseball history… but not too much.  I promise. 

Back in 2002, burdened with the smallest payroll in baseball, the Oakland A’s (for “Athletics”) needed to find low-priced “diamonds-in-the-rough” to make them competitive with teams with substantially larger budgets.

Following a “sabermetric” approach, constructed by legendary baseball analyst Bill James, the A’s studied previously neglected statistics – “on-base percentage”, which includes walks notjust hits, (because who cares how you get on base?), “fielding percentage” (assessing run-saving defensiveability), etc. – the A’s execs unearthed low-priced talent, overlooked because they rated less highly by the less scrupulous standards of the day, which, beyond affordability, helped the Athletics to win.  

Using unconsidered statistics, the A’swon more games than an impoverished franchise predictably should.  (They are doing surprisingly well this season.)  Soon, other teams, like the Boston Red Soxcaught the statistical fever, and, combining the innovative techniques with an opulent payroll, the Red Sox won three World Series since 2004, after winning none since 1918.

Watching the winning, the sabermetric tidal wave inevitably swelled.  A Red Sox chief executive moved to the Chicago Cubs, where, in 2016, applying similar techniques, he brought the Cubs their first World Series championship since 1908.

The Dodgers too ascended the sabermetrical bandwagon, and, in 2017, they made their first World Series appearance since 1988.

So what happened this "down" season? 

Too much “numbers.”  

Not enough “feel for the game.”

Here’s how that worked. Or, based on this year’s Dodgers’ “Won-Lost” record, doesn’t work.

Hubristically energized by last season’s success, every “Game Day”, the Dodgers executives, through their compliant manager, assemble a lineup based on  statistically reliable winning-edge “match-ups” – determining which hitters are likely to prevail against which pitchers – the most reliable predictor being that if the opponents’ “Starting Pitcher” is a “Lefty”, you strategically load up your lineup with right-handed hitters.  And, of course, vice versa.  (Which, being smart people, you can figure out for yourselves.)

That’s how they construct each individual game’s batting order, calibrating their chances of winning strictly according to “match-ups.”   

It sounds good, a “Blackjack” aficionado, cleverly “counting the cards.”  But here’s what happens when you go entirely by “match-ups.”

Focusing solely on “winning-edge” advantage determining by which batters are in here, throughout this entire season, the Dodgers have had no set outfield.  The Dodgers also have had no predictable batting order.  And the Dodgers infielders, meant to execute like a well-calibrated timepiece, are moved in and out of position, dependent entirely on who’s pitching against them.

Most egregious example:

(Note:  This has nothing to do with injuries.  Just statistical strategy.)

The Dodgers’ left-handed first baseman is often positioned in center field, although only against right-handed pitchers.  (So his replacement at "first", another left-handed batter, can be inserted into the lineup.)  By my unofficial count, five different Dodgers have played first base this year.  And only one of them is consistently good at it.  And that guy’s out in the outfield.  Where he is not necessarily the best outfielder.

Hey, guys.  What happened to “Fielding Percentage”?

But more importantly… and I heard a retired ballplayer say this on TV just yesterday, his critical gist being:

“Hey, “Brain Trust”!  They’re not robots!  They are not interchangeable parts!  Yes, they’re wonderful athletes.  And they’ll never complain because they‘re professionals.  But, believe me, I was a player.  They do not enjoy what you are telling them to do. 

“There is something intrinsically valuable in running out the same line-up and batting order on a regular basis.  It provides structural stability, a measure of ‘team cohesion’ and a predictable ‘comfort zone’ for the players.”

With a hyper-reliance on statistical analysis, the players’ “predictable comfort zone” has been effectively obliterated.   And along with it, the razor-slim winning-edge sabermetrics was originally intended to supply.

If the players the Dodgers Front Office assembled can’t win, they should get new players.  Having selected the players they have, however, it would be helpful if they trusted them.  And they remember they’re human.

A "team" is more than uniformed chess pieces.

Paraphrasing the Muppets,

You gotta put down the “Stats Sheet” if you want to play the saxophone.